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./5:9n.). 148 character from two standpointsfrom subjective principles.Kant connected the concept of a maxim withthe empirical character of a human being when he wrote that,every human being has an empirical character of his power of choice, which isnothing other than a certain causality of his reason, insofar as in its effects inappearance this reason exhibits a rule, in accordance with which one could derivethe rational grounds of the actions themselves according to their kind and degree,and estimate the subjective principles of his power of choice.(Pure Reason, A549/B577,emphasis added)From this statement and the one previously quoted it is evident that Kantthought of our characters as causal laws for our actions.A person s characteris a law required in order to fit all of his or her actions as effects in theworld into the single [deterministic] series of the natural order. But thecausal law of character, as such, seems also to be a singular summationof a person s various maxims: the subjective principles of his power ofchoice [Willkür]. Knowing that a causal agent acts according to laws, andobserving variabilities of circumstances corresponding with variabilities inits actions, we can formulate (estimate) particular laws for explaining itsactions in their circumstances.Where those particular laws are presumed tobe self-imposed by the agent, that is, where they are regarded as subjectiveprinciples of action, they are maxims of the agent s character.5.6 Empirical and Intelligible CharacterBecause all of a person s actions would be causally determined through thecausal laws of his or her character, by which they fit into the single causalseries of nature, Kant concluded that in regard to this empirical characterthere is no freedom (Pure Reason, A550/B578).Accordingly, he wrote, for a subject in the world of sense we would have first an empirical character,through which as in the passage quoted above, its actions, as appearances,would stand through and through in connection with other appearancesin accordance with constant natural laws. Yet second, Kant continued, one would also have to allow this subject an intelligible character, throughwhich it is indeed the cause of those actions as appearances, but which doesnot stand under any conditions of sensibility and is not itself appearance (ibid., A539/B567).This means, as Kant indicated very soon afterward, that character from two standpoints 149the intelligible character would not stand under any conditions of time. So in contrast to the unfreedom or determinism characterizing empiricalcharacter, the intelligible character can be considered free.The relation between empirical and intelligible character is based on therelation between the person as appearance and as a thing in itself.Kantthought of the empirical character, he said, as a mere appearance of theintelligible character (A541/B569).He wrote also that the latter is thetranscendental cause of the former, and is indicated through it as onlyits sensible sign (A546/B574).The intelligible character, which cannotbe perceived, would have to be thought in conformity with the empiricalcharacter, just as in general we must ground appearances in thought througha transcendental object, even though we know nothing about it as it is initself (A540/B568).Worth pointing out here are two importantly different ways comment-ators have understood Kant s idea of intelligible character.I think bothare mistaken, though I think the error of the second way is more seriousthan that of the first.I ll explain why after outlining and comparing thesetwo different approaches to understanding Kant s conception of intelligiblecharacter.What characterizes the first interpretive approach most clearly, it seems, isthe idea that we freely choose our own intelligible characters.Kant definedcharacter as a law of causality, and connected our empirical characters withthe determinism of the natural world.This suggests, therefore, that wecan have control over our actions in this world only through control overour action-determining empirical characters.Yet we do not control howour empirical characters appear in this world as signs of our intelligiblecharacters.So it seems that in order to have control over our actions in thisworld we must have some kind of control over our intelligible characters.Understandably, then, some have assumed that in Kant s view we freelychoose our intelligible characters.²¹ Their assumption is that our chosenintelligible characters then appear as our empirical characters, through²¹ I think this is Wood s assumption; see Allen W.Wood, Kant s Compatibilism, in Wood,Self and Nature in Kant s Philosophy, 73 101 at 91.See also Bernard Carnois, The Coherence of Kant sDoctrine of Freedom, trans.David Booth (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 98; and JohnRawls, Lectures, 299 300.Louden views intelligible (moral) characters as freely chosen; and suggeststhat empirical moral education can conceivably shape and influence intelligible character.See RobertLouden, Kant s Impure Ethics: From Rational Beings to Human Beings (Oxford: Oxford University Press,2000), 59, 136 7. 150 character from two standpointswhose laws our actions are causally determined by prior events.I thinkthis representation of Kant s view of freedom and character is very nearlycorrect.But the second interpretive approach to intelligible character viewsit as consisting in little else besides freedom.According to Allison, forexample, the transcendental idea of freedom.provides the content tothe otherwise empty thought of an intelligible character. ²² In the firstapproach we are presumed to choose our intelligible characters by anexercise of freedom
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