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.Action X may ormay not have been a reliable cue to A s original intentions; but because of aself-fulfilling prophecy, it can seem to be a reliable cue to his ultimate ac-tions.The belief that others are ready to use violence can lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy either (a) when one is trying to decode the ambiguousactions of others (was it an indication of hostility or an honest mistake?) or(b) when it is plain that a bona fide conflict has arisen.In terms of the lattercase, once the conflict is out on the table, two parties may race to the firstblow as a matter of self-defense.Southern historian Grady McWhiney(1988), for example, recounted how a cycle of deadly violence perpetuateditself among those in the Old South who had ready access to guns:TLFeBOOK 12.PERPETUATING NORMS OF VIOLENCE 295As one observer of the South noted, enemies would meet, exchange insults,and one would shoot the other down, professing that he had acted in self-defense because he believed the victim was armed.When such a story wastold in court, in a community where it is not a strange thing for men to carryabout their person deadly weapons, [each member of the jury] feels that hewould have done the same thing under similar circumstances so that in con-demning him they would but condemn themselves. Consequently, they freethe slayer, and a hundred others, our sons and half grown lads amongstthem, resolve in their hearts, that since every man may go armed and every-one is therefore justifiable in slaying his enemy, they will do likewise. (p.163;quotations from J.A.Lyon, in Columbus [Mississippi] Eagle, June 1, 1855)In terms of the present-day inner city, Anderson (1994) also noted that in-ner-city youths who do not subscribe to the code of the streets (code ofhonor) still must follow it as a defensive strategy.Anderson argued that thevast majority of inner-city residents have not internalized the code of thestreets. Yet in many situations, it is necessary for them to play by its rulesmerely because others, making similar calculations, also find it necessaryto play by the code.As Anderson wrote, Knowledge of the code is largelydefensive; it is literally necessary for operating in public.Therefore, eventhough families with a decency orientation are usually opposed to the val-ues of the code, they often reluctantly encourage their children s familiaritywith it to enable them to negotiate the inner city environment (p.82).Indi-viduals may follow the code merely because they expect others to do thesame; as Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) and Putnam (1993) showed, such en-vironments in which people distrust their neighbors and thus act unco-operatively or aggressively can be remarkably stable and persistent overtime (see also Axelrod, 1984, on the potential stability of both uncoopera-tive social strategies and reciprocity).CULTURAL RESISTANCE AND CULTURALCHANGEIt might seem that an outdated social norm that no longer has adaptivevalue is a fragile and unstable thing that should be easy to overturn.But asthe examples at the beginning of the chapter make clear, outdated culturalnorms and practices can have surprisingly long lives.In the case of long-standing historical honor norms, how have these norms had such stayingpower? As described earlier, situations in which people expect that insultswill lead to violence can result in situations where insults (or in some cases,things that only potentially look like insults) really do lead to violence.Fora cultural norm to change, not only do individual values need to change,but often there needs to be a shared public recognition of this change.TLFeBOOK 296 VANDELLO AND COHENDespite surprising cultural inertia in the South, there is reason for hope.Cultural norms are also susceptible to unpredictable and rapid shifts, andgroups of cooperating actors can band together to form subcultures thatcan gradually or rapidly expand.The example of ending the long-standingpractice of footbinding young girls in China provides an illustration of anorm that was rapidly changed.The thousand-year-old practice of foot-binding died in just over a generation in some regions of China after a num-ber of families got together to form anti-footbinding societies and pledgednot to let their sons marry women whose feet had been bound (Mackie,1996; Rosen, 1997, p.178).This was an effective strategy perhaps because itgave people opposed to the practice an opportunity to find each other andform interacting networks with the opposite norm.(For another modelingof how small numbers of cooperating individuals can band together, find re-ciprocating partners, and dramatically expand their presence in a popula-tion, see also Axelrod s [1984] Evolution of Cooperation, pp.63 69.) Relatedly,the anti-footbinding societies were perhaps also effective because theybroke down a more widespread pluralistic ignorance regarding how peopleprivately felt about the practice of binding women s feet.In the laboratory, social psychologists have demonstrated how muchpower a small minority can have in challenging a norm.Asch s (1955) clas-sic conformity studies demonstrated how conformity effects could bewiped out by breaking the perceived consensus of the group.When even asingle dissenter was present among an otherwise unanimous (but incorrectand privately wary) majority, subjects conformity was greatly diminished.Extrapolating a bit, the same processes might be involved in creating cul-tural change
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