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.Rodney, finding himself foiled, hauled up again on the sametack as the enemy, both fleets now heading to the southward and eastward.Later, he again made signal forbattle, followed an hour after, just at noon, by the order (quoting his own despatch), for every ship to beardown and steer for her opposite in the enemy's line. This, which sounds like the old story of ship to ship,Rodney explains to have meant her opposite at the moment, not her opposite in numerical order.His ownwords are: In a slanting position, that my leading ships might attack the van ships of the enemy's centredivision, and the whole British fleet be opposed to only two thirds of the enemy. The difficulty andmisunderstanding which followed seem to have sprung mainly from the defective character of the signal book.Instead of doing as the admiral wished, the leading ships carried sail so as to reach their supposed stationabreast their numerical opposite in the order.Rodney stated afterward that when he bore down the secondtime, the French fleet was in a very extended line of battle; and that, had his orders been obeyed, the centreand rear must have been disabled before the van could have joined.CHAPTER X.MARITIME WAR IN NORTH AMERICA AND WEST INDIES, 1778-1781. ITS INFLUENCE U170 The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783There seems every reason to believe that Rodney's intentions throughout were to double on the French, asasserted.The failure sprang from the signal-book and tactical inefficiency of the fleet; for which he, havinglately joined, was not answerable.But the ugliness of his fence was so apparent to De Guichen, that heexclaimed, when the English fleet kept away the first time, that six or seven of his ships were gone; and sentword to Rodney that if his signals had been obeyed he would have had him for his prisoner.(1) A moreconvincing proof that he recognized the dangerousness of his enemy is to be found in the fact that he took carenot to have the lee-gage in their subsequent encounters.Rodney's careful plans being upset, he showed thatwith them he carried all the stubborn courage of the most downright fighter; taking his own ship close to theenemy and ceasing only when the latter hauled off, her foremast and mainyard gone, and her hull so damagedthat she could hardly be kept afloat. 1.In a severe reprimand addressed to Captain Carkett, commanding the leading ship of the English line,by Rodney, he says: Your leading in the manner you did, induced others to follow so bad an example; andthereby, forgetting that the signal for the line was at only two cables' length distance from each Other, the vandivision was led by you to more than_two_leagues_distance from the centre division, which was therebyexposed to the greatest strength of the enemy and not properly supported (Life, vol.i.p 351).By all rules oftactical common-sense it would seem that the other ships should have taken their distance from their nextastern, that is, should have closed toward the centre.In conversation with Sir Gilbert Blane, who was not inthis action, Rodney stated that the French line extended four leagues in length, as if De Guichen thought wemeant to run away from him (Naval Chronicle, vol.xxv.p.402). An incident of this battle mentioned by French writers and by Botta, (1) who probably drew upon Frenchauthorities, but not found in the English accounts, shows the critical nature of the attack in the apprehension ofthe French.According to them, Rodney, marking a gap in their order due to a ship in rear of the Frenchadmiral being out of station, tried to break through; but the captain of the Destin, seventy-four, pressed upunder more sail and threw himself across the path of the English ninety-gun ship. 1.History of the American Revolution. The action of the 'Destin' was justly praised, says Lapeyrouse-Bonfils. The fleet ran the danger of almostcertain defeat, but for the bravery of M.de Goimpy.Such, after the affair, was the opinion of the wholeFrench squadron.Yet, admitting that our line was broken, what disasters then would necessarily threaten thefleet? Would it not always have been easy for our rear to remedy the accident by promptly standing on to fillthe place of the vessels cut off? That movement would necessarily have brought about a melee, which wouldhave turned to the advantage of the fleet having the bravest and most devoted captains.But then, as under theempire, it was an acknowledged principle that ships cut off were ships taken, and the belief wrought its ownfulfilment. The effect of breaking an enemy's line, or order-of-battle, depends upon several conditions.The essentialidea is to divide the opposing force by penetrating through an interval found, or made, in it, and then toconcentrate upon that one of the fractions which can be least easily helped by the other.In a column of shipsthis will usually be the rear.The compactness of the order attacked, the number of the ships cut off, the lengthof time during which they can be isolated and outnumbered, will all affect the results.A very great factor inthe issue will be the moral effect, the confusion introduced into a line thus broken.Ships coming up towardthe break are stopped, the rear doubles up, while the ships ahead continue their course
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