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.58 BBC-SWB: DS18.59 Heikal, Cutting the Lion s Tail, p.148; Kyle, Suez, p.222; TNA, FO371/118999;Humphrey Trevelyan, Public and Private (London, 1980), p.79.In mid-October, Nasser toldthe English journalist Tom Little that no compromise was possible: Sir Eden intends to attackme and there is nothing I can do about it ; Calvocoressi, Suez, p.45.Dorril claims that Littlewas a senior MI6 agent and head of the blown spy ring, and that the Egyptians knowinglyfed him with disinformation; Stephen Dorril, MI6: Fifty Years of Special Operations (London,2000), p.631.60 Mar i, Political Papers , pp.362 3.Other insiders confirm that the Egyptian regime,which had never really anticipated war, saw it as increasingly unlikely, making few substantivemilitary plans; author interview with Ambassador Gamal Naguib, Cairo, 19 April 2004 (inEnglish); Howeidy and Mahmoud Interviews.Heikal does argue that the withdrawal of troopsfrom Sinai that summer constituted a deliberate preparation for hostilities; Heikal, The CairoDocuments, pp.90 91, 105; Heikal, Milafft, pp.462 4.However, since the redeploymentseems to have been planned as early as June, based on reduced assessments of the Israelithreat and the need for training with new Soviet weapons, it is not clear evidence that Nasserexpected an attack; Sheffy, Unconcern at Dawn , pp.16 24. The Suez Nationalization and its Aftermath in Egypt 159at 10 1 against , and he still seemed obdurate and defiant on 19 September. Eventhe more thoughtful, the British Ambassador concluded a few days later, are atthe moment inclined to think that there is no longer any danger of war and that theaffair is now virtually over, securing the domestic position of the Egyptian regime.61Given his strong initial preconception that the danger of war would reduce overtime, Nasser is likely to have been particularly open to incoming information thatcarried this implication, such as polls showing opposition to war in Britain, as wellas world opinion (expressed, for example, through Nehru s belief in India s ability tomediate a peaceful solution), which led him to conclude that the Suez crisis had:become the problem of the whole world, which is defending the freedom for which it hasstruggled in the face of the use of aggressive force and the policy of force pursued by thebig Powers.62There is some indication that in September, the Military High Command, unlikethe Egyptian political leadership, might seriously have anticipated a British attack.63The Egyptian Army Operation Order 1 September 1956 for the Defence of Egyptstated: It is expected that some Western states will carry out hostile actions againstEgypt as a result of the Suez nationalisation, and outlined plans that assumedEgyptian forces would be unable to resist, focusing on delaying battles, retreat andsubsequent guerrilla warfare, rather than active defence or counter-attack.64 Theyprobably expect that the Egyptian armed forces would be defeated in a short period,Trevelyan reported in August, and plan, in that case, to disrupt the security forcesand Administration and for many of the Free Officers to go underground. 65In any case, there was little foundation for the bravado displayed by GeneralAbdel-Hakim Amer, Nasser s close friend and army chief:My confidence regarding the safety of the situation is unbounded & We started ourpreparation before the President announced the nationalisation of the Suez Canal & Weshall not be taken by surprise.I can promise you the war against us will not be the picnicsome people believe or talk about.66By October, however, especially once the UN negotiations had begun, and evenmore so when the Six Principles and plans for further negotiations in Geneva hadbeen agreed, the Egyptian leadership virtually ruled out the danger of invasion.6761 TNA, PREM 11/1100, 1102.62 12 August 1956, BBC-SWB: DS18.See Kyle, Suez, pp.188, 226; Fayek Interview.63 Author interview with General Talaat Mosallem, Cairo, 8 December 2004 (inEnglish).64 Troen and Shemesh, The Suez Sinai Crisis 1956, p.377.See Amin Howeidy, Nasserand the Crisis of 1956 , in Louis and Owen (eds), Suez 1956, p.169; A.F.Abu al-Fadl, Kuntun iban li ra %2łs al-mu3 % abart (Cairo, 2001), pp.103 4.65 TNA, FO371/118999.Eden minuted the file: Tell him to cheer up! But the ForeignOffice failed to pass on the message.66 3 September 1956, BBC-SWB: DS36.67 It was felt, by the elite and most Egyptian diplomats, that the crisis had burnedout and the steam had gone out of the situation ; TNA, PREM 11/1102; Heikal, The Cairo 160 Reassessing Suez 1956The army reduced its level of alert and resumed training, as concerns over thepossibility of Middle East war began to focus on the Israel Jordan border
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