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.Now in place as the commander-in-chiefof a militarized propaganda program, Eisenhower s administration took hiscampaign theme of peace and transformed it into global propaganda cam-paigns with both international and domestic implications.The first of thesecampaigns surrounded the death of Stalin and was publicly referred to as theChance for Peace campaign.The second was labeled the Atoms for Peacecampaign and sought to exacerbate fears over atomic power in the hands ofcommunist leaders, while lessening such apprehensions over U.S.basednuclear activity.3The motives underlying the Chance for Peace and Atoms for Peace cam-paigns of 1953 reveal the ubiquitous nature and the militarization of the 152 The Period of InstitutionalizationEisenhower administration s propaganda campaign of peace.Such plans toexploit Stalin s death began as early as October 1952 and ended with theglobal efforts surrounding the Atoms for Peace campaign that lasted from1953 through 1955 and beyond.Within this period, Eisenhower sinstitutionalization of a militarized structure led to a militarized mindset,resulting in the greater coordination of propaganda strategy, the develop-ment of long-range propaganda campaigns more reflective of military phi-losophy, and most significantly, the articulation of goals that stepped-uprather than reduced the threat of war.The Chance for Peace and the Atomsfor Peace campaigns illustrate most clearly the means by which the Eisen-hower administration combined bully pulpit activity with covert communi-cation, revealing the changes that Eisenhower brought to the practice of therhetorical presidency.Eisenhower s propaganda campaigns were completewith defensive (e.g., reactive) and offensive (e.g., proactive) tactics thatblended the themes of peace, nuclear disarmament, and scientific super-power status of the United States themes that held cross-cultural appeal ina world frightened by the threat of nuclear holocaust.4 Such overt themes,though, masked the complex layering of covert, psychological warfare ma-neuvers underlying the Eisenhower administration s Cold War motives.Asrecently declassified materials reveal, the Eisenhower administration initi-ated plans to transform the Truman administration s communist strategy ofcontainment to one of total extinction that might involve a full-scale waragainst communism.Such mobilization demanded the production of vari-ous propaganda and psychological warfare strategies that would allow theU.S.government to continue nuclear testing and build-up for war,showcasing Eisenhower as a presidential pioneer for the peaceful uses ofatomic energy.The psychological strategizing sessions reveal an adminis-tration as committed to nuclear proliferation as to negotiating a peaceful so-lution to the Cold War.THE CHANCE FOR PEACE CAMPAIGNMuch of the research surrounding Stalin s death centers on Eisenhower sApril 16, 1953, Chance for Peace speech.The Eisenhower administration sattempt to gain the propaganda advantage during the Soviet exchange ofpower, however, extended far beyond the few months surrounding Stalin sdeath in 1953.Once launched, campaign organizers feared the success oftheir own propaganda and thus sought to ensure that any peace overture of-fered by the Soviet Union would be viewed skeptically by the nation s ColdWar allies.All of the activities surrounding Eisenhower s Chance for Peacecampaign thus provide insight into the psychological strategies of the mili- The Rhetorical Presidency 153tarized propaganda program as his presidential message became the center-piece of long-term propaganda campaigns.Planning for Stalin s DeathEven though Stalin did not die until March 6, 1953, the PsychologicalStrategy Board (PSB) planners began preparing for his imminent deathsome five months earlier as part of their doctrinal warfare strategy.5 In part,the PSB sought to seize the psychological initiative with the Sovietleader s death.6 Additional hidden aims also existed, however, with propa-gandists wanting to exacerbate the turmoil surrounding a Soviet transfer ofpower.As PSB staffer William J.Morgan articulated on March 4, 1953, Our strategic guiding principle, as well as our secret goal, should be to doeverything to encourage and promote chaos within the USSR. 7 In addition,George A.Morgan, acting director of the PSB, claimed that such a rhetori-cal exigence offered an opportunity for world leadership by the Presi-dent. 8 In order to achieve the psychological advantage, to promote chaos inthe Soviet Union and to elevate Eisenhower to a supreme leadership posi-tion, the PSB called for all information media under United States Govern-ment control, both overt and covert, [to].begivenstanding instructions inthe event of Stalin s death. 9In order to maximize the psychological advantage, the PSB expendedconsiderable energy toward psychologizing and anticipating not only theKremlin s response to Stalin s death but also the possible reactions of theSoviet public.The PSB presupposed that like any government the USSR[was] sensitive to any development that Soviet leaders regarded as an actualor potential threat to their power position. Yet in spite of this normal sensi-tivity, the PSB believed that Soviet leaders represented a psychologicalanomaly a near psychopathic hypersensitivity toward threats broughtabout by an atmosphere of conspiracy, the tensions of totalitarianism, and the immutable hostility between Communists and non-Communists. Such views of Soviet vulnerabilities inspired caution among PSB planners.They feared that the Soviet leaders exhibited a callused insensitivity to thecosts of preserving [their] position. Despite such psychological concerns,though, the PSB wanted to adapt U.S.propaganda to the most sensitivecommunist vulnerabilities that might incite the Soviet people to revolt.PSBplanners thus highlighted numerous themes, including the lack of individ-ual freedom, religious oppression, forced labor, desperate living condi-tions, and alleged Soviet warmongering themes that epitomized PSB stransfer of power campaign.10 154 The Period of InstitutionalizationMembers of the PSB also anticipated and prepared for the Soviets ownpropaganda moves.Such projections demonstrated the militarized propa-ganda operations of the U.S.government, complete with defensive and of-fensive tactics.Edward P.Lilly, a PSB operative, feared, for example, thatthe Russian leaders might attribute all the difficulties to Stalin s controland as a propaganda gesture indicate even with specific action that theywere willing to terminate the Korean war. In countering such a Soviet ac-tion, Lilly recommended that rather than using a high government official todenounce any peaceful gesture, that contacts be made with Americancolumnists and even editorial writers, to warn them of the dangerous im-plications.of falling into a Soviet trap. These contacts were to be madeeven before the Soviet Union implemented such a plan so as to thwart its psychological impact. 11 Toward that end, Lilly viewed any Soviet re-sponse as a mere propaganda ploy even one that brought about the end ofthe Korean war.This view implied that Lilly privileged the status quo over apeaceful compromise in the Cold War conflict because the former stood tofurther the propaganda efforts of the United States
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