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.I prefer not to remember the melancholy Philby.Instead, I like tothink of the man I knew in the late 1970s, a man who was sober mostof the time and who displayed a wry, knowing sense of humor.Ilike to think of the Kim Philby who, when asked to do some assign-ment for the KGB, would flash me a smile, nod his head ever soslightly, and say in his elegant Cambridge accent, I am at the serviceof your Service. 0465014453-Kalugin.qxd 11/24/08 10:25 AM Page 166This page intentionally left blank 0465014453-Kalugin.qxd 11/24/08 10:25 AM Page 167CHAPT E R 6The Spy GameBY THE MID-1970S, THE KGB OFFICERS IN MOSCOW ALONE 50,000outnumbered all the employees of the CIA and FBI combined.TheKGB was nothing less than an enormous army of a half million men.About 220,000 of them guarded the Soviet Union s borders.Most ofthe rest served the KGB at home, comprising that huge totalitarianapparatus that hounded dissidents and troublemakers, opened mail,tapped telephone lines, eavesdropped on apartments and offices,shadowed foreigners, investigated crimes, and generally kept an irongrip on our sprawling and, just below the surface, unruly land.We inthe KGB s foreign operations were a relatively small, elite unit, and wewere proud that we trained our sights on foreign enemies of the So-viet Union, not on our own people.In fact, some of us in intelligenceviewed the domestic KGB as an unsavory, cruel, and totalitarian orga-nization, and we were glad to have as little to do with it as possible.In March 1973, Yuri Andropov called on me to head the KGB s for-eign counterintelligence operations.The following year, at age forty, Ibecame the youngest person in the postwar history of the KGB everpromoted to the rank of general.By that time, I was overseeing a dizzy-ing growth in our counterintelligence operations overseas, a growththat was mirrored in many other sections of the KGB.My relatively167 0465014453-Kalugin.qxd 11/24/08 10:25 AM Page 168168 SPYMASTERsmall organization, which had come to be known in 1972 as Direc-torate K of the intelligence branch, was in the process of expandingfrom two hundred to seven hundred officers.We also were opening abroad attack on the CIA and Western intelligence services, while atthe same time trying to significantly tighten control over the bur-geoning number of Soviets working abroad.On the KGB s sprawling organizational chart, foreign intelligence(known as the First Chief Directorate) was one large branch on anotherwise enormous tree.There were about twelve thousand of usworking in the First Chief Directorate.To get a feel for the immensityand bureaucratic complexity of the KGB, one need look no fartherthan my unit, foreign counterintelligence.Though we only had aboutseven hundred officers, we were divided into eight departments thatran the gamut of KGB operations.Department One was assigned to penetrate the CIA, the NationalSecurity Agency, the FBI, and various branches of American militaryintelligence.As later sections of this story will show, we workedaround the globe to achieve that goal, probing and attacking U.S.in-telligence from Ghana to Greece to Finland.Department Two was assigned to penetrate NATO and Western in-telligence services.We enjoyed respectable success primarily becauseof an aging but loyal group of spies who had burrowed into Frenchand English ranks around the time of World War II.Our East Germanbrothers made sure we had thoroughly infiltrated West Germany s se-cret services.Department Three was assigned to penetrate other intelligenceagencies around the world, from China to Latin America.In manycountries, for example India, we were successful in our mission,though the results helped us only marginally in our primary strugglewith the United States.Department Four was charged with infiltrating Soviet émigré orga-nizations and centers of ideological subversion, and that we did well.Department Five was responsible for internal security.Its task wasto monitor the twelve thousand employees of the intelligence direc- 0465014453-Kalugin.qxd 11/24/08 10:25 AM Page 169THE SPY GAME 169torate to ensure they did not spy for the West or defect.To this end, ourforeign counterintelligence officers in embassies around the world andin Moscow monitored the activities of Soviet intelligence personnel.Astime passed, our record on defections and internal security lapses grewworse, and now it is clear we were swimming against the tide of his-tory.Department Five also was responsible for security at all USSR in-telligence installations outside the country s borders.In addition, we were assigned to keep an eye on all Soviets travel-ing and working overseas, from diplomats to tour groups to troupesof artists.We didn t have the manpower to infiltrate every group butrelied on informers who were liberally sprinkled among the delega-tions that went abroad.Department Six was in charge of transportation, which essentiallymeant that we had to keep an eye on every boat, truck, or plane thattraveled outside the USSR.When two Soviet truck drivers deliveredcargo to Europe, one or both of them would report to the KGB.When a Soviet merchant marine or scientific vessel sailed overseas, atleast a quarter of the crew were KGB officers or informers.At leastone of the officers on board invariably was with the KGB.WhenAeroflot planes flew around the world, the flight crews were riddledwith KGB informers.No matter what the mode of transportation, if it was Soviet andchugged, steamed, rumbled, or jetted overseas, we controlled it.Department Seven was our information and analysis section, whichby the end of the 1970s had become the most exhaustive and up-to-date source of intelligence data and analytical reporting in the KGB.Using our own sources of information, as well as those from EasternEuropean intelligence agencies and Soviet military intelligence, we puttogether daily, weekly, monthly, and yearly bulletins.They described theactivities not only of the CIA and NATO counterintelligence services,but also of the secret services from Indonesia to Peru.We looked at themethods used to recruit our people in foreign ports and capitals, andsent our summaries to Soviet counterintelligence sections throughoutthe USSR and the world.Domestic counterintelligence officers used our 0465014453-Kalugin.qxd 11/24/08 10:25 AM Page 170170 SPYMASTERtop secret reports to get a sense of what was happening in the espionageworld beyond the Soviet Union s borders.We also reported on terror-ism, drugs, and international crime.Relying heavily on American and NATO sources, our annual reportreviewed events of the previous year in international politics and inespionage, and made predictions about the future.We also produceda highly classified book entitled Who s Who in the CIA.It was about asthick as a Manhattan phone directory and contained biographical in-formation on ten thousand current and former CIA agents.I ploppedit on Andropov s desk in 1977, saying it was my present to him inhonor of the sixtieth anniversary of the Russian Revolution.An-dropov was delighted, and I even suggested going public with thebook to embarrass the CIA.When John Barron s book KGB was published listing the names ofhundreds of KGB officers, I told Andropov, Give me the appropriateorder, and we ll publish the book CIA all over the world.Every CIAofficer around the world will become known. Don t do that, replied Andropov. Just use it for our work
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