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.This showed that there was a robust interplay between internationaldevelopments and domestic agents acting on foreign policy.Third, while the pro-Israel lobby remained strong during the periodsunder examination, it had to adapt to the emerging reality of the Intifadaand pro-Arab exploitation of its images and those of the peace process.6Moreover, after the end of the Cold War, pro-Israel organizations lost a chiefreason in their case for American support of the Jewish state, fighting com-munism.However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, groups like theAmerican Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) lobbied hard to get ter-rorism to become the new adversary.To their fortune, this put them in thesame camp as the neoconservative terror warriors that would take power inthe White House a decade after the end of the Cold War, following the 9/11attacks.7 Their work paid off as Americans and their policymakers under-stood that terrorism was both the most serious threat and that it had anArab (i.e.Islamic, Palestinian) face.8 Hence, any loss of power in pressuringpolicy that the pro-Israel lobby may have experienced because of theIntifada s imagery, the fall of communism, and the peace process, wasmade up for in a spectacular way by the dreadful strikes on the US main-land.Still, the Bush administration, consistent with public opinion and for-eign policy elite perceptions, could not sustain the war on terrorism withoutdiplomatic efforts toward a key issue for terrorists, Palestinian torment underan American-backed Israeli occupation, hence an important catalyst for theroadmap and United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions 1397and 1515.These explicit demands for two states overlapped with the Arablobby s argument through 9/11 that peace between Israel and the Palestinianswould deny terrorists a strategic recruiting tool.9 This brings us to the fourthpoint regarding US policy espousal of a Palestinian state.In the era ofthe roadmap and overwhelming international consensus on it, the pro-Arab lobby currently has a position that most other lobbies could only hopefor: popular and policymaker support for their course of action toward theIsraeli Palestinian conflict.These four points, summarizing what has come before, help conceptualizethe problem that will occupy the rest of this chapter.Acknowledging the linkbetween public opinion and foreign policy toward Palestinian statehood,what ought those interested in peace consider if the Israel lobby, which isastronomically more powerful than its pro-Arab counterpart, has doneeverything in its strength to frustrate the plan for two states? Since theroadmap, which enjoys near-unanimous support, has established that theinterests of security and morality demand a Palestinian state, then it isworthwhile to examine that proposal and its relationship to peace.Such atask inevitably leads to the debate on whether the two-state solution practi-cally serves a peaceful end.As it stands, the pro-Israel lobby s actions in thatregard are at odds with what it understands to be necessary for Israel toremain a Jewish democracy Palestinian statehood.10 122 Two states versus oneThe stakes for Middle East peace are very high.11 Yet under considerablepressure by Israel s lobby, which benefits from public sympathy for theJewish state, American policy has failed to realize peace between the Israelisand Palestinians, despite its stated purpose to do so.As shown elsewhere,there are several explanations for that failure.First, policymakers have tra-ditionally followed public opinion insofar as they have supported Israel overthe Arabs.And even though they heeded public preference for the pursuit ofpeace through the two-state solution, they have yet to ensure that Israelwould allow for the meaningful existence of a Palestinian state.Second,while the pro-Israel lobby has always professed that its actions are in the USnational interest, it has hindered policymakers from pursuing the manifestAmerican goal of Middle East peace.12 Under direction from AIPAC, pro-Israel groups have attempted to delay peace through the two-state frame-work, from pressuring the US government into prohibiting dealings with thePalestinian Authority (PA) and other key players in the region, to coaxingPresident Bush to agree with former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon that Israelwould not vacate West Bank settlements.13 If followed through, that agree-ment would be the last nail in the coffin of the land for peace process toresolve the Israeli Palestinian conflict.Third the pro-Arab lobby has not effectively countered the AIPAC-ledIsrael lobby to an extent that would curtail its activities against the two-statesolution, as proven by the fact that the US has yet to apply effective pressureon Israel to keep up its end of the bargain in the negotiations for a workablePalestinian state.American evenhandedness depends on the ability to checkpro-Israel lobbyists who blindly follow the Jewish state s hard line, some-times to a point that makes Israelis themselves uncomfortable.14 Given all ofthis, it is likely that the conflict will continue and even escalate asPalestinians struggle against the injustices of dispossession and occupation.If there was a genuine interest in peace, one of two things would have tohappen.Either the Palestinians, in accordance with the roadmap and theUNSC resolutions, would establish a truly sovereign state of territorialintegrity without hindrance, or Jews and Arabs would have to live on anequal basis in a democratic, secular state that dispenses with religious iden-tity as the determiner of full citizenship.Of these two scenarios, the interna-tional community as well as the Israelis and the Palestinians have opted fortwo states
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